This article will examine the references made by Porphyry to pagan rituals in the De Philosophia ex oraculis in order to understand better the author's attitude towards traditional religious practices.
I shall not discuss here the key issues that arise from these statements. Yet, it should be noted that these modern controversies have overlooked the analysis of the remaining fragments.
The aim of this article is to delve into Porphyry's attitude towards religious practices in the light of the fragments that are attributed with certainty to the De Philosophia ex oraculis. In addition, I shall also compare it with the fragments of the Letter to Anebo, as well as with Iamblichus' answer in his De Mysteriis. Indeed, while assessing Porphyry's views on religious practices, modern scholars have traditionally opposed the De Philosophia and the Letter to Anebo. They usually relied on the common interpretation of Porphyry's intellectual development, which supposes an evolution from early superstition to later rationalism. On the contrary, A. Smith has shown that these two works do not express opposite attitudes towards pagan religious practices; and he claimed that the Letter to Anebo should no longer be considered as the attack of a rationalist mind on superstition and magics, but rather as a constructive enquiry about pagan rituals. 7 It is now time to turn to the prologue of the De Philosophia ex oraculis in which Porphyry explained the aim of his work. 8 In the first lines, the author claims that an accurate interpretation of traditional oracles could help a philosopher in the search for salvation. 9 According to Porphyry, the teaching of the gods' revelations could provide philosophers with a means to find an end to their questions.
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In this context, Porphyry announced that his commentaries on oracles aimed at -3 -providing his reader, on the one hand, with some philosophical principles revealed by the gods and, on the other hand, with more practical accounts intended to help the person who looks at the contemplation and purification of life. 11 It is not clear whether, as has usually been asserted by scholars, the treatise was practically organised according to this dichotomy between philosophical accounts and practical features of the teaching of the oracles. In view of the remaining evidence, I would prefer to consider that this distinction constitutes two features of Porphyry's argumentation, and merely represents two different levels of interpretation.
At any rate, it is clear that, on many occasions, Porphyry sought to explain and justify the validity of religious practices. At that time, the justification of pagan rituals was at stake: indeed, pagan intellectuals increasingly tended to reject some traditional rituals, such as blood sacrifice. 12 The denunciation of pagan rituals as nonsense was at the core of the Christian attacks against paganism.
In the De Philosophia ex oraculis, Porphyry's main argument consists in justifying religious practices thanks to the assertion that everything concerning the divine world, and hence also ritual performances, was imposed upon men by the gods themselves. In this regard, the author claims that: in what kind of places they abide; and all the things whereby men thus honour them there is not one which they were not taught by (the gods) -4 -themselves. As the proofs which confirm this are many, we will bring forward a few out of number, not to leave our statement without witness (Transl. Gifford).
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In all likelihood, Porphyry referred here to the well-known account of Plato's Republic (IV 427b) where it is claimed that the Delphic Apollo has enacted the best laws 'having to do with the establishing of temples, sacrifices, and other forms of service to gods, daemons, and heroes, the burial of the dead, and the services that ensure their favour'. This article will focus on the manner in which Porphyry commented on the divine words in order to justify the first two features of the debate about religious practices, that is to say, sacrifices and magic.
First, Porphyry used Apollinian oracles in order to justify traditional blood sacrifices. In that context, Porphyry quotes a long verse oracle of Apollo. In this prophecy, the god gave precise information on the different victims to be sacrificed.
According to him, the victims must differ, depending on the type of deities concerned, whether terrestrial, infernal or celestial. 15 This is the kind of material typically used by
Christian authors (here Eusebius) to emphasize the nonsense and barbarism of pagan religious practices. Modern scholars also referred to this kind of oracles in order to emphasize both Porphyry's superstition and his lack of criticism and rationality.
However, as is shown by the remaining fragments, the commentaries made by Porphyry in the De Philosophia differ from the contents of the oracles, and, therefore, we should not identify Porphyry's intentions merely with the contents of the texts he commented on.
In this particular example, Porphyry gives notice that he used this oracle in a part of the work intended to the worship (θεραπεία). It is employed in order to establish the rank (τάξις) of the different divine entities.
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In the following commentary, which is the longest piece of the De Philosophia we have properly preserved, Porphyry did his best to show the logics of the classification exposed in the oracle. His first explanation is that the sacrifices are meant to be sumbola (σύµβολα), which are only clear to clever men. 17 In the view of Porphyry, oracular revelations thus contain symbolic meanings that are to be understood and interpreted by sensible men.
The second explanation refers to the principle according to which 'like is delighted about like' (τῷ ... ὁµοίῳ χαίρει τὸ ὅµοιον). As it has been recently reminded, this rule of 'like to like' goes back very far in Greek thought. 18 However, in the context of theurgic practice, it refers to the identification of certain natural substances with definite parts of levels of the cosmos and the spiritual entities inhabiting them. 19 Porphyry uses this rule in order to explain that one must sacrifice animals living in the same element as that of the deities for which the animal is intended.
The same kind of classification is found in the Letter to Anebo, where Porphyry claims that the divine entities are to be classified according to the different kinds of bodies (aetherial, aerial or earthly).
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In Pythagoras of Rhodes according to whom 'the gods who are invoked over the sacrifices have no pleasure therein, but come because they are dragged by a certain necessity of following, and some of them more, and some less'.
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Porphyry admits the truth of Pythagoras' statement, but only because it was confirmed by the oracles (ἐκ τῶν λογίων): 'For as Pythagoras had made these statements, I learned how true his words are by close observation of the oracles'.
Later on, Porphyry notes that 'For all the gods say that they have come by
compulsion, yet not simply so, but as it were, if I may so speak, by compulsion under the guise of persuasion'. 25 In this passage, Porphyry created a new word, πειθανάγκη, in order to explain that which happens when the gods accept to be invoked. This term combines the pejorative notion of constraint (ἀνάγκη), with that of persuasion (πείθω), whose importance is well-known in Platonism and will be developed by Iamblichus.
In the following passage, Porphyry quotes an oracle in which Apollo himself advises to someone to perform magical rituals (τὰ µαγεία) in order to purify his soul -7 -and to be able to receive the god. Porphyry comments on the sacred prescription by asserting that 'hereby it is clearly shown that the use of magic in loosing the bonds of fate was a gift from the gods, in order to advert it by any means'. 26 Regarding two other oracles about the constraint exerted on the gods during the divination act, Porphyry adds that 'they give out answers for their own compulsion, as will be shown by Apollo's answer about his own compulsion'. 27 We know that Porphyry would probably have condemned such magical practices.
However, by describing magic as a gift from the gods and by showing that the gods themselves accepted to be constrained, Porphyry seems to answer the severe attack formulated by pagan philosophers and Christian apologetists against such practices.
Unfortunately, Eusebius's scattered quotations do not allow for a proper understanding of Porphyry's opinion about magic and constraint. Nevertheless, we can connect these comments to the passages of the Letter to Anebo where Porphyry has also questioned the manners in which men could address the gods. 28 Conversely, Iamblichus firmly refuted the fact that gods could be compelled by humans. He claimed that theurgy differs from magic especially because it does not exert constraint on gods.
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In conclusion, we have seen that Porphyry used pagan oracles in order to justify some traditional religious practices, like sacrifices and magic. The first conclusion we can come to is that the philosopher's explanation was that cultic matters depended on a divine rule, and that oracles of the gods were the expression of this rule. In this regard, the commentaries of Porphyry aimed at explaining the logics of this rule, which was sometimes hidden to men by the symbolic character of the oracular language.
The overwhelming impression conveyed by the evidence is that the accounts διδασκαλίαν. 'And the utility which this collection possesses will be best known to as many as have ever been in travail with the truth, and prayed that by receiving the manifestation of it from the gods they might gain relief from their perplexity by virtue of the truthworthy teaching of the speakers' (Trans. Gifford).
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Porphyry F 303 (Smith) = Eusebius, Prep. ev. IV 7, 1: ἕξει δὲ ἡ παροῦσα συναγωγὴ πολλῶν µὲν τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν δογµάτων ἀναγραφήν, ὡς οἱ θεοὶ τἀληθὲς ἔχειν ἐθέσπισαν· ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ καὶ τῆς χρηστικῆς ἁψόµεθα πραγµατείας, ἥτις πρός τε τὴν θεωρίαν ὀνήσει καὶ τὴν ἄλλην κάθαρσιν τοῦ βίου. 'And our present collection will contain a record of many doctrines of philosophy, according as the gods declared the truth to be; but to a small extent we shall also touch upon the practice of divination, such as will be useful both for the contemplation and the general purification of life' (Trans. Gifford) 
